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Abstract
The proper alignment o f authority and responsibility within and between various levels o f  social or- 
ganization is a fundamental governance problem. This study used a review approach to critically 
interrogate the political economy o f  the allocation o f environmental jurisdictions among the Zimba­
bwean state, local communities and Rural District Councils through the conferment, to the latter, o f  
the authority to enact conservation and landuse planning by-laws. The subsidiary aim was to investi­
gate, through afield  study, the practical operation o f the by-laws in everyday social life, in an analysis 
that situates the effectiveness o f  the by-laws within the theme o f proximity to citizens. Several flaws 
and contradictions are evident in the political economy o f the allocation o f authority and responsibil­
ity among the above actors. Assignment o f the responsibilities is fram ed within a top-down structure 
in which entrustments are transferred solely to Rural District Councils at the expense o f other levels o f  
social organization, particularly those close to the citizens. Although parent legislation allocates broad 
powers to Rural District Councils, monitoring o f  the effectiveness o f  such allocations is done on the 
basis o f  whether the governance arrangements deliver on the state’s goals, and not on local people’s 
goals and aspirations. But there is not much scope fo r  communities to effectively participate in gov­
ernance at the Rural District Council level. There also is not much scope in parent legislation fo r  
revising these governance arrangements, with higher level actors enjoying the prerogative to effect 
amendments, and not the communities. Governance arrangements fostered by the by-laws punish 
citizens fo r  not respecting arrangements that the citizens do not effectively participate in crafting. 
Revenues accruing from fines imposed on people violating such arrangements accrue to the Rural 
District Councils, and not to the communities from  which they are extracted. The study argues fo r  
innovative governance approaches that entail fundamental changes in by-law articulation.
Introduction
Hierarchy is the dominant form in which human 
societies are generally organized (Brett, 1996). 
Differences in power and interests, however, 
abound within and between various levels of most 
tiered regimes (Hasler, 1993; King, 1994). The 
contours of such power and interests are dynamic 
as they are subject to contestation and negotia­
tion. It is difficult, from a governance perspec­
tive, to secure the proper alignment of authority 
and responsibility within and between the vari­
ous levels o f such system s (H asler, 1993;
Coglianese, 1999). A central question of the po­
litical economy of the assignment of jurisdiction 
within tiered governance contexts relates to when 
an allocative arrangement becomes optimal or 
effective. Answers to the question vary depend­
ing on ideological standpoints, but debate on the 
issue has been dominated by two contending 
policy thrusts - the big government ideals of cen­
tralization and the “small is beautiful” standpoint 
of decentralization (Murphree, 2000).
Proponents of the former see consolidation into 
unitary jurisdictions giving greater scope to units 
enjoying consolidated jurisdictional endowment
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to coordinate policies more effectively, address 
spill-over effects and to exploit economies of scale 
(Crook and Manor; 1998; Agrawal and Ribot, 
forthcoming). In addition, consolidation carries the 
appeal of sovereignity, i.e. promoting and inte­
grating the benefits of shared values and interests 
across large areas (Coglianese and Nicolaidis,
1996). Consolidated jurisdictions unfortunately 
have inherent tendencies to over-centralize - “they 
aspire to assert authority over large areas but their 
au th o rita tiv e  reach  often  exceeds the ir 
implementational grasp” (sensu, Murphree, 2000). 
Decentralization, on the other hand, is expected 
to create small units that are more responsive to 
local needs and preferences, provide opportuni­
ties and incentives for policy innovation, lower 
the costs of planning, and give citizens a greater 
voice in governance by fostering direct face to face 
democracy (Crook and Manor, 1998). The quest 
for smallness, however, seldom fully addresses 
problems of social difference and variegated in­
terest - its merits notwithstanding. Moreover, too 
much cleavage is likely to result in many small 
jurisdictions and related failure to achieve effec­
tive coordination amongst such jurisdictions.
The centralization-decentralization dichotomy, 
nevertheless, appears to be of limited analytical 
value in understanding operational aspects of the 
assignment of jurisdiction in tiered regimes. The 
dichotomy is implicitly based on a source-sink 
model. Such a model appears to assume a one-off 
allocational process in which entrustments are 
permanently abstracted from one level and retired 
into another level. A related assumption of the 
model is that the purposes of such transfers are 
automatically met once the transfer is done, or that 
conditions elsewhere are static such that, once 
assigned, jurisdictions will always remain secure 
and effective. But this rarely happens in a com­
plex and dynamic world in which policy intent 
seldom fluently translates into intended outcomes 
(Berry, 1993; Ferguson, 1994). Moreover the goals 
of governance may be expected to vary from time 
to time, and from one governance system to an­
other. This implies that there can never be a uni­
versal governance goal that will continue to be 
satisfied in perpetuity by a particular centraliza­
tion or decentralization arrangement. Studies on 
the assignment of governance, therefore, need to 
move beyond the appropriateness of centraliza­
tion or decentralization or from static notions of 
one-off assignments of jurisdiction to dynamic ahd 
process-based analytical approaches (Coglianese 
and Nicolaidis, 1996). Particular governance ar­
rangements may result in unintended outcomes, 
and changes in related socio-political and other 
environments may supercede the goals for which 
given governance systems were originally crafted.
Coglianese and Nicolaidis (1996), therefore, 
hold that governance arrangements can best be 
conceived as “punctuated equilibria” characterized 
by a “pendulum effect” in which power flows back 
and forth between levels. They argue that it is 
important to understand allocation mechanisms of 
any governance context and how these are crafted, 
combined and traded off against each other. Us­
ing principal-agent theory they propose four 
mechanisms through which jurisdiction can be 
allocated within tiered governance regimes includ­
ing delineation, monitoring, sharing and revers­
ibility mechanisms. Principal-agent relationships 
develop when authority is shifted from one set of 
players - representing the principal, to another set 
- representing the agent, with mechanisms being 
put in place to ensure that the authority gets used 
for purposes underlying the delegation, and not 
usurped or abused for other purposes (Agrawal,
1997).
Delineation ensures that delegated authority is 
not usurped or abused by providing a clear speci­
fication of the scope of the delegation, as well as 
the standards and guidelines for the exercise of 
that authority. Among other things, monitoring 
helps ensure: whether the agent is operating within 
the confines of the scope of delegation; whether 
the assignment is achieving the goal for which it 
was intended; or whether set standards and guide­
lines are being followed. The principal may also 
reduce the agent’s discretionary powers by shar­
ing in the activities of the delegated unit. Sharing 
mechanisms include: separation of powers e.g. be­
tween legislative, judiciary and executive arms of 
a jurisdiction; representation of lower units in 
higher units; and decision-making arrangements
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within sharing arenas, i.e. whether by majority or 
unanimity. Reversibility provides for a corrective 
measure to help ensure re-alignment of other 
allocative mechanisms so that governance arrange­
ments meet the goals for which they are intended. 
Examples of reversibility arrangements include 
provisions specifying the expiry date! of a par­
ticular delegation to allow for scrutiny and review 
or revocability arrangements that allow the en­
dowed level to step in to revoke the delegation 
under certain circumstances.
Allocation mechanisms may, from time to time 
or from place to place, vary in their extent, inten­
sity or explicitness. For instance, delineation could
Figure 1: Map of Zimbabwe showing the
location of Chivi District
1 Coglianese and Nicolaidis terms such arrangements “sunset pro­
visions” in which delegated authority automatically reverts to the 
endowed level upon the tolling of a specific deadline.
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be narrow or broad, monitoring may range from 
loose to tight or from regularized to ad hoc, whilst 
reversibility may be explicit or implicit. Permuta­
tions of sharing mechanisms can therefore be vari­
ously traded-off against each other to ensure cost- 
effective governance - e.g. broad delineation may 
be complemented by tight monitoring and explicit 
sharing arrangements could be matched with less 
reversibility. Decisions made within a cost-effec­
tive governance system also need to be as suit­
able and as efficient as possible. In general, these 
conditions are better optimized if  jurisdictions 
remain as close to the citizens as possible. The 
theme of closeness of jurisdictions to citizens is 
enshrined in the principle of subsidiarity, which 
holds that problems are best solved in the subsys­
tem in which they arise2. Alternatively phrased, 
the principle states that in order to protect basic 
justice upper level actors should undertake only 
those initiatives that exceed the capacity of lower 
level actors (Schilling, 1995).
The main aim of this study was to critically in­
terrogate the political economy of the allocation 
of environmental jurisdictions among the Zimba­
bwean state, local communities and Rural District 
Councils through the transfer, to the latter, of au­
thority to enact conservation and landuse planning 
by-laws. Questions considered go beyond princi­
pal-agent ties of how the state holds local govern­
ments accountable, to include the implications of 
such transfers on how local government can be 
held accountable to local populations, since the 
transfers are ostensibly done to create local au­
tonomy. A subsidiary aim of the study was to re­
late practical aspects of the formulation and op­
eration of the by-laws to the theme of proximity 
to citizens and how this impinges on the effec- 
tiveness3 of the by-laws. By-laws are treated 
within a generic frame of reference for the former 
aim since aspects of the allocation of jurisdictions
2 Murphree (University of Zimbabwe, Centre for Applied Social 
Sciences - in a personal communication) captures the essence of 
the principle in somewhat different but related terms - “adminis­
trative self-sufficiency”.
by way o f by-laws apply in sim ilar fashion 
throughout the country’s 55 districts. The study 
relied on review of secondary material, including 
relevant legislation, for the former aim. The sub­
sidiary aim mainly relied on fieldwork conducted 
in Chivi District in which informal interviews were 
held with Rural District Council officials, coun­
cillors, council resource monitors, headmen, vil­
lage heads and other ordinary men and women!
The next section of the article gives a broad 
overview of Chivi District, with an emphasis on 
some of the features that impinge on the opera­
tion of the by-laws. The subsequent six sections 
cover the main aim - they consider questions of 
what is being transferred, to whom, how, and with 
what effect. The penultimate section considers the 
issue of practical political economy of the by-laws 
in everyday social practice, in an analysis that situ­
ates the relevance and observance of the by-laws 
within the theme of proximity to citizens.
The study area, Chivi District
Chivi District, in south-central Zimbabwe, is 
one of the seven districts comprising Masvingo 
Province (Figure 1). Much of the district experi­
ences marginal environmental conditions charac­
terized by low and erratic rainfall, frequent 
droughts and generally poor soils and these are 
generally constraining to many forms of agricul­
ture (Anderson et al. 1993). The last national cen­
sus of 1992 recorded a population of 157 277 per­
sons from the district’s 30 wards, with much of 
the population being concentrated in administra­
tive and service centres and communal areas (Cen­
tral Statistical Office, L992). Twenty six of the 
wards lie in communal areas, three in resettlement 
areas and one in a sm all-scale com m ercial
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3 The criteria for effectiveness are likely to depend on the goals 
for which a particular governance system is put in place, but in 
this study effectiveness is considered within the contexts o f rel­
evance, respect and observance of the by-laws by the communi­
ties - since the by-laws are ostensibly meant to ensure local au­
tonomy.
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ing area. Because of population pressure much of 
the woodland in the communal areas has been 
opened up for cultivation. Subsistence farming 
forms the predominant livelihood activity through­
out much of the district, but it is often augmented 
by marketing of surplus, production of cash crops 
and selling of woodcrafts. The latter has become 
significant along the. Harare-South Africa main 
road, which runs along the southern portion of the 
eastern part of the district (Braedt and Standa- 
Gunda, in press). The drainage of the district is 
dominated by two major rivers flowing towards 
the south east, the Tugwi and the Runde rivers. 
Sections of the former mark parts of the district’s 
eastern border while the latter flows along the 
western parts of the district.
Transferring authority upwards 
or downswards?
The direction of delegations has important im­
plications on proximity of governance systems to 
the citizens, with potential implications on rel­
evance and effectiveness. In federated regimes del­
egations occur from lower units, which are closer 
to the citizens, to upper unions and federal bod­
ies. Lower level units delineate the scope of the 
delegation, monitor its exercise and they hold the 
prerogative to withdraw or revise the delegated 
authority. But because of historical and other fac­
tors, governance systems in most developing coun­
tries, including Zimbabwe, are over-centralized 
(Mandondo, in press) . Various forms of pressure 
are being exerted on such regimes to decentralize 
but most such decentralizations are effectively di­
rected in top-down mode by state-level and other 
external actors who are remotely located from the 
citizens. It could be argued that, in spite of their 
remoteness from citizens, state-level structures 
embody a democratic spirit since they consist of 
parliament, the supreme law-making body, which 
is comprised of democratically elected individu­
als. The separation of powers between the legis­
lature, the executive and the judiciary arms of gov­
ernment may additionally be seen as providing 
checks and balances for the proper exercise of au­
thority. In practice, such arrangements only pro­
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vide very broadly for democracy and accountabil­
ity (Ribot, 1999). Thus, although laws and poli­
cies from the state may purportedly champion the 
cause of citizen participation “the chorus of such 
participation has a distinct upper class accent” 
(Coglianese, 1999).
The above is broadly the context characteriz­
ing the top-down allocation of environmental ju ­
risdictions through the conferment, to Rural Dis­
trict Councils of the authority to enact by-laws 
that are legally-binding to areas under their juris­
diction. Parliament is the supreme law-making 
organ and lower level bodies like the Rural Dis­
trict Councils (and municipal authorities) are sub­
ordinate bodies which enjoy delegated authority 
to make subsidiary regulations, rules, orders and 
by-laws. By-laws seek to provide more fully for 
issues addressed in parent legislation. They are 
an elaboration of the council’s mandate to man­
age, protect and conserve natural resources 
(Mohamed-Katerere, 1999). Various acts grant 
Rural District Councils with legal personality and 
legally defined areas of competence within which 
it has authority to plan, tax, and spend and enjoy 
limited or minor legislative competence. The next 
section outlines some of these acts.
Instruments for conferment of 
authority to enact by-laws:
The Rural District Council is the level at which 
effective decentralization ends, at least in terms 
of the legal framework. The Communal Lands Act 
vests control over land in the president, but de­
volves its administration to the Rural District 
Councils. The act therefore designates Rural Dis­
trict Councils as de jure land authorities. The Rural 
District Councils Act reinforces the powers that a 
variety of other laws vested in the councils: the 
Communal Lands Act defines them as land au­
thorities, with powers to allocate land under their 
jurisdiction, in conjunction with district adminis­
trators ; the Parks and Wildlife Act designates them 
as appropriate authorities over wildlife resources 
in their areas; the Communal Lands Forest Pro­
duce Act vests them with the power to grant li­
censes for timber concessions in communal ar-
5
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farmeas; the Natural Resources Act designated 
them as authorities for the conservation of re­
sources within their districts; and, the draft Envi­
ronmental Management Act seeks to grant them 
appropriate authority status over a broad range of 
resources. The Rural District Councils Act addi­
tionally vested councils with the following pow­
ers: raising revenues through taxes, levies and tar­
iffs from their areas; acting as local planning and 
development authorities; enacting legally-binding 
landuse planning and conservation by-laws that 
apply for areas under their jurisdiction. The next 
section considers how the Rural District Coun­
cils’ legal personality and organizational setups 
have impinged or impinge on grassroots partici­
pation.
Rural District Councils as units 
enjoying designation as legal persons
Rural District Councils are therefore vested with 
legal personality through a variety of acts. Most 
of the Rural District Councils were created from 
the amalgamation of colonial rural councils, which 
represented the interests of white settlers on pri­
vate land - and district councils, which represented 
the interests of the black majority in communal 
lands. The colonial predecessors of district coun­
cils were native boards, which were later suc­
ceeded by African Councils, and these were put 
in place to extend settler colonial administration 
through a system of indirect rule (Holleman, 1968; 
Weinrich, 1971). The founding philosophy of in­
direct ru le was “governance on the cheap” 
(Chanock, 1998; Ranger, 1983). Indirect rule was 
entrenched under the guise of enhancing the role 
of indigenous administrative forms in governance 
but it was meant to entrench colonial control and 
to secure easy collection of taxes. These so-called 
African boards and councils consisted of head­
men and chiefs who were supervised and kept 
under tight administrative and fiscal control by 
colonial native administrators. Rural D istrict 
Councils as legal persons enjoying minor legisla- 
. tive authority to make legally binding by-laws 
therefore have their roots in undemocratic struc­
tures, which were designed to entrench colonial 
domination.
Local government reform in the postcolonial 
period did seek to infuse some democratic ele­
ments into such structures. The implications of 
such reforms on the scope for popular participa­
tion will have to be critically examined in terms 
of the extent to which they allocate effective power 
to citizens at the grassroots, since statutory exist­
ence seldom equates with the advancement of 
public interest (Brett, 1996). Community or popu­
lar participation is about communities having de­
cision making powers or control over resources 
that affect that community as a whole (Ribot,
1998). An analysis of how the Rural District Coun­
cils are constituted and how they function gives 
insights on whether they are bodies that effectively 
represent or are accountable to the communities.
In terms of membership, the Rural District 
Councils consist of elected councillors represent­
ing the interests of their constituent wards, dis­
trict heads of line ministries, council executives, 
chiefs as ex officio members, and co-opted NGOs, 
in some districts. Thus, far from being homog­
enous, the Rural District Councils potentially rep­
resent a complex mix of grassroots, customary, 
bureaucratic and technocratic interests. In princi­
ple, the composition of the RDC should not entail 
any contradiction since it potentially provides for 
a sharing forum that blends the top-down visions 
of sectorally-deconcentrated technocrats and bu­
reaucrats with the bottom-up visions of elected 
community representatives. In practice, such shar­
ing does not, on its own provide for full-proof 
accountabilities since related electoral processes 
are fraught with their own flaws. For instance, elite 
political interests in Zimbabwe have, during the 
postcolonial period, patronized the process result­
ing in the election of politicized councillors, who 
owe allegiance to, and are upwardly accountable 
to the major political party that endorses their can­
didature (Mandondo, in press).
The Rural District Councils operate through a 
system of committees, each tasked with a specific 
mandate. Chivi Rural District Council has the fol­
lowing committees: finance and staffing; planning; 
social services; natural resources; licensing; and 
an “advisory” Rural District Development Com­
mittee (RDDC). The Rural District Development 
committee is a powerful arm of council consist­
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ing of district heads of government ministries, 
chairpersons of the Rural District Council’s other 
committees and district heads of national security 
organs. It is presided over by the District Admin­
istrator, a bureaucrat representing the Minister of 
Local Government and National Housing. Coun­
cillors as representatives of grassroots communi­
ties are thus under-represented in the Rural Dis­
trict Development Committee, and yet the RDDC 
is the district’s supreme planning body charged 
with consolidating various grassroots plans from 
the wards into the district’s annual and five year 
plans. In principle the RDDC is supposed to dis­
charge its mandate within an advisory context but 
in practice the body normally operates in the di­
rective mode - the RDDC simply reports unilat­
eral resolutions without being effectively account­
able to council. Thus, although the Rural District 
Development Committee is potentially a forum 
for melding community and sectoral plans, in prac­
tice, it attenuates the spirit of popular participa­
tion and sidelines community plans and visions. 
The dominance of technocrats at the district level 
partly underlies the technicist content and orien­
tation of the set of by-laws adopted and endorsed 
by Chivi Rural District Council. The issue of the 
content of by-laws is considered in later sections 
of this article. Suffices to note at this point that 
Rural District Councils, as legal persons with mi­
nor legislative competence over by-law formula­
tion in areas under their jurisdiction, do not effec­
tively represent the visions and aspirations of 
grassroots communities, neither are they effec­
tively accountable to them.
Any other alternative legal persons 
out there?
Although most political and administrative sys­
tems have multiple tiers (Hasler, 1993; Brett, 
1996), most of Zimbabwe’s decentralization laws 
presently only recognize two nodes of social or­
ganization between which legal entrustments can 
be transferred - basically from the state to the dis­
trict. The only exception is the Parks and Wildlife 
Act which assigns legal authority over wildlife 
resources among the state, district councils and
private individuals, and this is only so because of 
specific historical circumstances. The 1975 ver­
sion of the act had vested custodianship over wild­
life resources in white farmers on freehold land 
who were designated as the “appropriate authori­
ties”. A 1982 amendment to the act sought to ad­
dress the discriminatory nature of the act by ex­
tending the benefits of the act to peasant commu­
nities in wildlife-rich areas. But because of the 
peculiar nature of communal land tenure in peas­
ant areas, the amendment extended appropriate au­
thority status to Rural District Councils in which 
the peasant communities lived. Communal land 
tenure4 combines a system of traditional freehold5 
entitlements to arable and residential land, beyond 
which he communally-owned land and resources 
(Government of Zimbabwe, 1994; Moyo, 1996). 
In such a system a variety of actors may hold rights 
to resources which others, as individual or com­
munities of individuals, may morally or legally 
be obliged to respect. The complexity of overlap­
ping rights and the fuzzy and amorphous mem­
berships and interests in such systems probably 
constitute major hurdles to their designation as au­
tonomous legal persons. This is could be one of 
the reasons why Rural District Councils, moulded 
as they were around relatively clearer structures 
with more concrete mandates, have tended to be 
empowered at the expense of grassroots structures.
But several studies have argued that the so- 
called participatory or decentralized management 
systems at district level are essentially state man­
agement writ small (Murombedzi, 1991, 1992, 
1994; Murphree, 1990,1991,1997; Mandondo in 
press). In spite of a veneer of accountability, par­
ticipatory resource management systems imple­
mented through district structures are generally 
practised on the terms and conditions of actors 
who are far removed from the resource use set­
ting (Schroeder, 1999). Hence, Murphree (2000) 
decries the absence of bodies that can be defined
4 After Murombedzi (1990), tenure, in this context, is defined as a 
bundle of rights entitlements to the use of land and its products by 
a clearly defined individual or group
5 Legally, the “private” arable and residential holdings are only 
usufruct entitlements as, under the Communal Lands Act, all com­
munal land is state land.
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as legal persons below the district and above the 
level of the household. This is a call for plurality 
in the locus of conferment of minor legislative 
competence, from the conventional state to dis­
trict focus, to new approaches that affirmatively 
recognize other levels in social hierarchies, par­
ticularly those closer to the grassroots. But the 
confounding question relates to the criteria on 
which such units can be defined.
In theory, the best setup is that which de­
fines users of resources as owners and managers 
of the resources so that the costs and benefits ac­
crue directly to them (Ostrom, 1990; Murphree, 
1991). Achieving such an arrangement is, in prac­
tice, easier said than done because of the multiple 
and dynamic nature of forms of social organiza­
tion below the district level. The Communal Ar­
eas Management Programme for Indigenous Re­
sources, Z im babw e’s flagship to community- 
based management of wildlife resources, is based 
on the concept of the “producer community” - held 
as the basic unit of social organization through 
which communities can be empowered to man­
age local resources (Peterson, 1991). Explicit in 
preliminary programme designs was the need to 
focus on democratic units at the sub-district level 
as the producer communities (Martin, 1986). The 
programme’s implementation, however, reflects 
fuzziness of scale and institutional (organisational) 
focus - CAMPFIRE was variously implemented 
at the levels of demographically-defined admin­
istrative units including village development com­
mittees, ward development committees or even 
entire districts (Peterson, 1991; Murphree, 1997).
CAMPFIRE essentially evolved as a social 
experiment. Its implementation, mainly through 
wards, was the result of strategic compromise 
between insular sectoral interests - particularly the 
local governance interests of the Ministry of Lo­
cal Government and National Housing and the 
conservation and other interests of the Department 
of National Parks and W ildlife M anagement 
(Murphree, 1997). Allocative problems and con­
flicts are among some of the major problems 
bedeviling CAMPFIRE (Murombedzi, 1994). 
Such problems mainly arise from the implemen­
tation of the programme through arbitrarily de­
fined administrative units that fail tp “marry so­
cial and ecological topography” (sensu, Murphree, 
1997). A fundamental shortcoming of most of 
Zimbabwe’s devolution laws and policies is then- 
failure to identify appropriate structures closer to 
the grassroots and vest them with minor legal 
privileges. A related shortcoming is their reliance 
on encouragement for district authorities to de­
volve authority further and their failure to legally 
compel district authorities to devolve authority 
further (Murphree, 1997). As will be shown later 
devolution through persuasion results in top-down 
orientations in the articulation of by-laws, which 
Rural District Councils are legally-mandated to 
enact. Both of the above shortcomings are rooted 
in the top-down nature of the allocation of envi­
ronmental jurisdictions as opposed to bottom-up 
delegation.
The portfolio of minor legislative 
competence with regards to by-laws
The legislative authority of Rural District Coun­
cils is subsidiary to national statutes, and it has to 
be consistent with such statutes. The Rural Dis­
trict Councils Act includes a schedule that clearly 
specifies the areas in which the Rural District 
Councils enjoy privileges to enact legally bind­
ing by-laws. The schedule lists 116 areas, falling 
under a fourteen-part category of issues, over 
which council may enact the by-laws (Appendix 
1). Part 2 of the schedule, circumscribes the range 
of issues over which council can enact by-laws 
relating tp property including natural resources 
held under common property arrangements in 
peasant areas. Additional sections of the schedule 
that are directly linked to other aspects of the en­
vironment include: part 6, relating to water re­
sources; part 7, which relates to sewage reticula­
tion and waste disposal; part 8, relating to wild­
life; and, part 13 relating to fire management. By­
laws are, therefore, meant to provide more fully 
for these and other issues. This section, and a pre­
ceding one, has already outlined the sources and 
elements of the subsidiary legislative roles con­
ferred upon Rural District Councils. The next sec­
tion considers the by-law formulation processes 
and examines the extent to which the processes
8
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allow for downward accountability to local com­
munities, for whom the by-laws are ostensibly 
meant.
Representation and accountability 
relations in by-law formulation
Rural District Councils have the option of for­
mulating the by-laws, with the participation of 
local communities, or adopting model by-laws 
from the Communal Lands (Model Landuse and 
Conservation by-laws, 1985). Model by-laws pro­
vide for the preparation of landuse plans in coun­
cil areas, and they are similar to those promoted 
by the state in the 1930s (Scoones and Matose, 
1993). They are based on a landuse planning sys­
tem that makes use of aerial photographs to di­
v ide landscapes in to  an 8-class system  of 
landunits, with a matching portfolio of suitable 
uses for each unit. Model by-laws are prescrip­
tive and they do not embody the spirit of commu­
nity participation. Because of their top-down ori­
entation the plans often do not accord with the 
priorities and coping strategies of peasant com­
munities (Scoones and Matose, 1993).
The process of formulating the by-laws with 
the “participation” of the communities does not 
turn out to be genuinely participatory or demo­
cratic either. In principle, by-law formulation 
should be preceded by a preparatory stage in which 
the need for formulating any set of by-laws is iden­
tified, ideally by communities, who can then no­
tify  council th rough  th e ir rep resen ta tiv e  
(Kundhlande, 2000). Arelevant standing commit­
tee of council, e.g. the Natural Resources Com­
mittee, then gets assigned the role of examining 
the justification of the need for such by-laws, con­
sulting expert opinion6, if  necessary, and then 
making recommendations to council. On face 
value this is a potentially democratic process in 
which local communities can demand to have the 
by-laws through their “democratically” elected
6 The Chivi Rural District Council by-laws stipulates that the coun­
cil seeks advice from the following government offices in the prepa­
ration of plans for communal and resettlement areas: the provin­
cial planning officer; the provincial Agritex officer and the regional 
officer in the Ministry of Environment and Tourism.
representatives. In practice, by-laws are formu­
lated at the district level, without effective par­
ticipation by the communities, and this occurs in 
most of the districts that opt not to adopt model 
by-laws (S AFIRE, 1999). Although councillors sit 
in council as elected representatives, the actual 
formulation of the by-laws is mapped onto the 
contour of power within council structures, in 
which council bureaucrats and technocrats have a 
much stronger voice. “Community” is a constitu­
ency of subordinate and weakened forms of power 
in local governance structures - it reflects frag­
mentary memberships and interests, and it repre­
sents a weakened and marginalized voice in key 
local government decision making fora, like the 
RDDCs (Mandondo, in press).
In spite of recognizing the need for local par­
ticipation in the authorship of by-laws, the frame­
work legislation does not provide authoritative 
guidelines on participation - it neither specifies 
minimum acceptable thresholds of participation 
nor the ways and means of achieving such par­
ticipation. The legislation, therefore, does not fully 
embrace the case for more public participation as 
a way for increasing democratic involvement in 
local government at the local level. It leaves Ru­
ral District Councils with considerable discretion­
ary powers about the extent and scope of commu­
nity involvement in deciding whether or not any 
proposed set of by-laws is necessary.
The actual formulation of by-laws is a tor­
tuous and extended process, with much of the time 
being allocated to allow for higher level provin­
cial officials, and the relevant minister, to scruti­
nize the by-laws before they endorse them. Out 
of the bulk of this time local communities are only 
given 30 days within which to inspect the by-laws 
and, if necessary, lodge objections. To facilitate 
the inspection of the by-laws by the local com­
munities the framework legislation obliges Rural 
District Councils to display the by-laws at the 
Council offices for the specified period and to 
publish them in a newspaper. Communities rarely 
inspect the by-laws partly because they are left 
out of the formulation process, whilst the by-laws 
themselves can only be inspected at the district 
level, or from obscure sections of newspapers that 
the peasants cannot easily access, let alone read.
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Objections from the community, if any are raised, 
are unilaterally deliberated upon by the council, 
which can adopt them in whole or in part, without 
further dialogue with the communities. The legis­
lation bestowing Rural District Councils with the 
power to enact by-laws, therefore, gives the coun­
cils wide discretionary powers, and denies the 
communities a sound basis on which to actively 
participate in the formulation of the by-laws. Fast- 
tracking of the inspection of the by-laws by the 
communities also undermines the spirit of popu­
lar participation in by-law formulation.
Endorsement of the by-laws is not done with 
the involvement of the communities - it is the ex­
clusive preserve of the relevant minister, to whom 
the Rural District Councils are accountable for the 
by-laws they formulate on behalf of the local com­
munities, and the decisions that they make on lo­
cal people’s objections. Whilst by-law inspection 
is fast-tracked at the community-level, with no “set 
pauses”7, the Minister and the Attorney Gener­
al’s office enjoy a set pause of up to 6 months, in 
which to thoroughly scrutinize the by-laws before 
approval. Rural District Councils submit the fol­
lowing documentation for ministerial scrutiny: the 
proposed set of by-laws; proof of consultation in 
the form of a notice in the press; list of all objec­
tions received; minutes of the council meetings 
where the by-laws were discussed; and, the final 
council resolution. The minister enjoys the dis­
cretion to modify or amend the by-laws or to rec­
ommend council to adopt model by-laws if the 
council’s by-laws are not substantially different 
from the model by-laws. Ministerial amendments 
to by-laws are not subject to negotiation or con­
testation by the Rural District Councils or from 
the community.
Effective legal systems are best founded on 
the beliefs and values of societies of which they 
are part (McAuslan, 1993). But the Rural District 
Councils Act provides for a process in which Ru­
ral District Councils are upwardly accountable to
7 “Set pauses” relate to allocation of sufficient “lag time’ during 
any stage of the process to give positive opportunity public reac­
tion and participation and presentation o f alternative choices 
(McAuslan, 1993). Note, however, that it implies context o f 
conditionality in which people are passive subjects with higher 
level authority in driving seat.
the minister in the formulation and approval of 
by-laws, instead of being downwardly account­
able to the local communities. But the minister is 
far-removed from the resource use setting and is 
thus not best placed to ensure that the by-laws 
embody the values and beliefs of the communi­
ties for which they are meant. Although vesting 
the minister with wide discretionary powers over 
the endorsem ent o f by-law s m ay be w ell- 
intentioned - e.g. to ensure that the by-laws are 
consistent with parent legislation - there is no sys­
tem of checks and balances to ensure that such 
powers are exercised in the interests of the grass­
roots communities. Vesting the minister with the 
prerogative to replace council by-laws with a 
model template of by-laws also defeats the pur­
pose of starting on the process in the first place. It 
is a sheer waste of time and resources, since 
vesting councils with by-law formulation privi­
leges is ostensibly done to take care of context 
specificity (Mohamed-Katerere, 1999).
Chivi Rural District Council by 
laws, the content
Although the framework legislation confers 
very broad delineations, the Chivi Rural District 
Council’s by-laws only provide in detail for 
landuse planning. The by-laws are rather silent 
with regards to the use and management of natu­
ral resources in communal and resettlement ar­
eas, for which the by-laws apply. They include 
just a few oblique restrictions on - owning, using 
and possessing a sleigh, cutting of trees and col­
lection of firewood and timber, and damage and 
destruction of fences and conservation works. The 
council’s schedule of fines, however, shows that 
the council imposes fines over areas that are not 
clearly provided for in the by-laws including caus­
ing of veld fires, poaching of game and fish, pull­
ing of ploughs on ground and cutting down of pro­
tected tree species. Although findings from the 
field study indicate that various forms of illegal 
allocation/utilization of land and felling of trees 
were amongst the major natural resource manage­
ment problems, there are other important issues 
that are neither provided for in the council’s set of
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by-laws nor the schedule of fines. Natural resource 
management issues not included in the by-laws, 
but reported to have become increasingly impor­
tant include those that were widely associated with 
the advent of the economic structural adjustment 
programme. Prominent among such issues were 
sand extraction for the construction industry, al­
luvial gold panning along the Runde and the Tugwi 
rivers, and extraction of soapstone (munyaka) and 
timber for the craft industry. The current Chivi 
Rural D istrict Council by-laws, which were 
gazetted in February 1996, repealed model by­
laws that had been adopted in 1987. In addition to 
their top-down orientations, and their failure to 
comprehensively provide for all the important 
natural resource management issues, the by-laws 
also appear somewhat static. Although the frame­
work legislation provides scope for review and 
amendments, the extended and tortuous nature of 
the process imposes disincentives8 for the coun­
cils to regularly undertake such reviews and 
amendments.
In spite of being formulated in a “participa­
tory” manner the Chivi Rural District Council by­
laws have a strong technicist content and are based 
on patronizing as well as command and control 
approaches to natural resource governance. They 
treat users of natural resources in peasant com­
munities as passive objects requiring assertive 
guidance from a more “rational’ outside. For in­
stance, provisions relating to setting aside of graz­
ing areas empower council to prescribe: stocking 
rates; grazing rights across owners; grazing peri­
ods; rest periods; and, appropriate conservation 
measures. Provisions relating to planning of cul­
tivation areas additionally allow council to specify 
the following: cultivation rights; means or imple­
ments to be used in given cultivation area; types 
of crops to be grown, and their rotation; contour 
ridging and land protection measures; and, when 
to leave the cultivation areas fallow. This means 
that decisions are effectively made outside the 
subsystems in which related problems occur, and 
this has implications on the relevance and effec­
tiveness of the by-laws.
8 From-a transaction cost perspective.
Enforcement, legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the by-laws
In addition to their technicist content and their 
origin in external imposition, the by-laws further 
criminalize local use of resources. They impose 
fines in order to restrict use of natural resources 
instead of putting in place voluntary systems of 
local regulation with incentives to ensure sustain­
able use. Local communities are, however, ex­
pected to cooperate with council monitors who 
impose fines for various violations, with the rev­
enue accruing to the Rural District Council. The 
arrangement therefore places the costs of an im­
posed governance system close to the people but 
not the benefits, which accrue to the Rural Dis­
trict Council, where income may be used for any 
other purpose, and not to address the environmen­
tal problems for which the fines would have been 
exacted.
Council employs two resource monitors per 
ward. The monitors assume duty after being 
elected with the “participation” of the local com­
munities and being subsequently vetted by the 
police. Most local people, however, denied hav­
ing participated in the election of monitors mainly 
because the process was not widely publicized. 
Others claimed to have just ignored the exercise 
because of other overriding priorities on their time 
and effort, and others because they saw the by­
laws as being “oppressive”. For instance, a head­
man remarked that much of what the by-laws did 
was to prevent people from using trees “...but no- 
one ever became pregnant to give birth to a 
tree...the trees are there for us all to use and care 
for... and the fact that we use the trees does not 
necessarily mean that we do not care for them”. 
Thus, in spite of a veneer of local involvement in 
the election of the resource monitors, such moni­
tors are largely seen as enforcing externally im­
posed regulations, and this impinges on the effec­
tiveness of enforcement of the by-laws.
The process of enforcement of by-laws involves 
issuing of tickets that impose fines on violators 
based on a schedule given to the monitors by the 
council. Personal details of the violator, includ­
ing the postal address, are entered onto two tick­
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ets - one of which is to be retained by the violator 
after signing, and the other sent to the Rural Dis­
trict Council. The person issued with a ticket is 
supposed to deposit the stipulated fine at the coun­
cil offices within a given period. Council officers 
are supposed to make follow-ups to ensure that 
people deposit their fines on time. Those who do 
not pay the fines risk being handed over to the 
police or to formal courts. Most of these arrange­
ments seldom work in practice. People issued with 
tickets often just quietly ignore the tickets with­
out paying the fines, and council officials rarely 
make follow-ups mainly because of logistical con­
straints. Not surprisingly, three council monitors 
interviewed estimated high default rates, with one 
estimating it to be over 60%. Council records of 
payment of fines, over a 21-month period between 
October 1996 and July 1998, also do not suggest 
high payment levels considering that these repre­
sent collated statistics for all the district’s 29 com­
munal land and resettlement wards for which the
by-laws apply (Table 1). Meanwhile, the study 
found no evidence of anyone having been handed 
over to the police for flouting the by-laws, and 
only one case of someone who opted to pay only 
after being threatened with a court case. Overall, 
the allocation of enforcement responsibilities to 
monitors by the council, without effective involve­
ment by the communities implies that the moni­
tors are upwardly accountable to the council and 
not to the communities to who the by-laws apply.
The enforcement picture is further worsened by 
the fact that most people, including the monitors, 
felt that the proportion of cases that went unde­
tected was far higher than those apprehended. This 
is underlain by several factors, not least because 
of low morale among the monitors. Low morale 
mainly arises from the failure by council officials 
to effectively complement the work of the moni­
tors by following up on the people issued with 
tickets, and poor levels of remuneration to the 
monitors. Each of the resource monitors earns a
Table 1 : Schedule of fines and records of payment of the fines for flouting the Chivi Rural 
District Council landuse planning and conservation by-laws between October 1996 
and July 1998
Offences Penalties in $ Number
Apprehended
% of total
Damage to roadside establishments 300 7 2.1
Causing veld fires 500 30 9.2
Stream-bank cultivation 100 5 1.5
Settlement, illegal homestead 100 61 18.7 .
Poaching, gaime and fish 100 61 0.3
Cutting down of trees, protected species 102-213 0 0
Cutting down of trees not protected 40 85 26.0
Possession of sleighs, pulling plough 100 • 17 5.2:
Unauthorized gardens 100 68 20.8
Unauthorised extension lands 100 44 . 13.4
Raising wire/fencing to go through 25 9 2-7
Unauthorised grazing 100 0 O '
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basis fee of $100 per month plus 10% commis­
sion on the amount of the fines the monitor will 
have caused to accrue to the council. Monitoring 
is therefore largely ad hoc and not intensive and 
regularized, as resource monitors invest their time 
and effort in other gainful activities. In general, 
there was greater evidence of the monitors rely­
ing on indirect methods of accounting for viola­
tors, like reliance on tip-offs from third parties and 
historical evidence of violations compared to di­
rect red-handed apprehension. The over-reliance 
of monitors on indirect evidence of violations was 
reported to often result in disputes between the 
monitors and suspected violators, as the latter do 
not easily own up.
Even when the suspects do own up and agree 
to pay fines, they mostly do so under protest as 
they perceive the fines to be punitive and unfair. 
The levels of the fines are arbitrarily pegged by 
the council - and not indexed to levels of commu­
nity outrage to various forms of breach, or to com­
munity perceptions of the legitimacy of such fines. 
All the monitors interviewed reported that they 
faced tremendous amounts of pressure from sus­
pects, with all of them having, at one time or an­
other, been threatened with bewitchment or threats 
of physical violence. On some occasion, one of 
the monitors was extricated9 from a brawl in 
which he was about to be axed by an enraged sus­
pect. The fear of violence or bewitchment may 
inhibit monitors from apprehending some sus­
pects, although some of them did not readily ac­
knowledge this.
All the monitors indicated that it was more ef­
fective to enforce the by-laws by enlisting the sup­
port of traditional leaders compared to relying on 
council officials. One monitor argued that the tra­
ditional leaders were generally more well-re­
spected than elected representatives “...because 
councillorship is basically nothing beyond a show 
of hands, but chiefly powers are deeper since the 
chiefs own the land and its people”. The threat of 
expulsion from a chief’s areas was widely ac­
knowledged as one of the most effective instru­
ments of chiefly power, which the chiefs could 
invoke against habitual offenders. Support from 
traditional leaders was reported to be easily forth­
coming when the by-laws were similar to local
rules, which the leaders wanted enforced e.g. pro­
hibitions against felling fruit trees, big trees and 
trees that grow in riverine areas. Enlisting the sup­
port of traditional leaders in enforcing council by­
laws legally entails no contradiction since the Tra­
ditional Leaders Act confers such a role on chiefs 
and headmen. Two sources of contradiction are, 
nevertheless, apparent.
First, the Rural District Council system of en­
forcing by-laws exists side by side with “tradi­
tional” systems for enforcing local rules. The tra­
ditional systems include implicit norms and mo­
res as well as explicit rules and enforcement ar­
rangements in which the chiefs’ and headmen’s 
police have the role of apprehending violators. 
Local enforcement also includes the spiritual be­
lief that even if one evaded being apprehended by 
other mortals, one could not evade the spirit guard­
ians of the land, who are believed by some to un­
leash divine visitations upon violators. Suspects 
accounted for by the ch ief’s police are either 
warned, made to pay goat or traditional beer fines, 
or expelled from the community if they are ha­
bitual offenders. The efficacy of these mechanisms 
was not assessed but most people interviewed re­
ported that such arrangements were generally bet­
ter well respected than council by-laws. There is, 
however, no coordination between the two natu­
ral resource regulation systems since suspects can 
find themselves being censured under either of the 
systems or both. Fines in the traditional system 
were reported to have historically been used to 
mitigate the transaction costs of convening courts 
at which cases of violations were heard, but of 
late people alleged increased incidents whereby 
some traditional leaders exacted the fines for their 
own benefit.
A second contradiction arises from the fact that 
whilst the Traditional Leaders Act recognizes tra­
ditional leaders as allies in enforcing top-down 
by-laws, other acts like the Communal Lands Act 
and the Rural District Councils Act still effectively 
retain land allocation powers that were taken away 
from chiefs in the immediate post-independence 
period. But chiefs have, over the years, continued
9 This was done by a headman after the suspect had refused to 
obey the impassioned pleas of many other people.
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to allocate land on the basis territorial, customary 
and other forms of claims to the land. The source 
of irony is that the chiefs are expected to uphold 
by-laws but such by-laws dilute and erode their 
major power base i.e. the authority to allocate land. 
The formal process of allocation of land entails 
that the prospective settler should bear a clear­
ance letter from the district of origin before ap­
proaching the headman and councillor for local 
approval. Final approval is done by a council land 
allocation committee consisting of the relevant 
VIDCO committee, the chief, the councillor and 
Agritex (national agricultural extension service). 
There is rampant flouting of this arrangement by 
chiefs and headmen, as home out by statistics in 
Figure 1, which show that various forms of ille­
gal landuse were amongst the most frequently 
flouted by-laws in Chivi over an 18-month pe­
riod. One of the councillors interviewed in this 
study estimated illegal land allocations to consti­
tute 60-70% of the new settlements in communal 
areas close to his home.
The latest wave of illegal land allocations was 
reported to have assumed elements of an infor­
mal real estate in the land, with some traditional 
leaders charging fees to prospective settlers. Sev­
eral high profile , cases of illegal land allocation 
were provided including one from the Barura area 
and another from an area close to the turn-off from 
the Chivi-Mhandamabwe main road to Mutangi. 
Resolution of both of these cases involved inter­
vention by the district administration and the Ru­
ral District Council. The Rural District Council 
requires traditional leaders who illegally allocate 
land to ensure the vacation of such land, or else 
face prosecution. If charges are preferred, the set­
tlers are made to pay fines for the trees they will 
have felled at a rate of $40 per tree.
This study also recorded cross-border ambigui­
ties in regimes of levies charged for sand extrac­
tion by the Chivi and the Masvingo Rural District 
Council. Both Districts have important sand ex­
traction sites along the Tugwi River. The Chivi 
Rural District Council, on one side of the river 
was charging $2 for every cubic metre of sand 
extracted, whilst the Masvingo Rural District 
Council on the other side charged $7.50 per cubic 
metre. The Chivi Rural District Council employs
locals to monitor and keep records of sand ex­
tracted. The monitors get a 10% commission. Dis­
parities in levies are unfair to the monitors on the 
Chivi side and these monitors sometimes end up 
conniving with new contractors, other than those 
licenced by council, from whom they obtain kick- 
backs.
Discussion
Several flaws and contradictions are evident in 
the political economy of the allocation of author­
ity and responsibility among the Zimbabwean 
state, local communities, and Rural District Coun­
cils through the conferment, to the latter, of au­
thority to enact by-laws that apply to areas under 
their control. Most of these problems arise from 
the top-down orientations of the assignment of 
such authority. First, although framework legisla­
tion confers very broad delineations over author­
ity to enact by-laws, monitoring is done on the 
basis of whether governance delivers on technicist 
goals of environmental conservation and “ra­
tional” landuse planning, and not on the priorities 
and aspirations of the local communities. Second, 
the entrustments are transferred solely to Rural 
District Councils at the expense of other forms of 
social organization, particularly those that are 
closer to the citizens. Third, although there is scope 
for sharing in governance, through popular repre­
sentation at district level, effective decisions at the 
district are made in bodies that are not account­
able to the council, since council is the forum in 
which the local representatives have a greater 
voice.
Fourth, there is no provision for reversibility, 
through amendments of the by-laws by the com­
munities, but by the Rural District Councils and 
the relevant minister. Such amendments can only 
be made on the basis of whether the governance 
is delivering on technical goals envisioning “ra­
tional” landuse planning and legal goals of con­
sistency with broader legislation. There is no ex­
plicit provision for amendments on the basis of 
community priorities, interests and goals. Fifth, 
in addition to being highly prescriptive the gov­
ernance system punishes citizens for not respect­
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ing arrangements that were put in place without 
their effective involvement and consent. Sixth, 
the revenue from the fines imposed on the local 
communities are siphoned to Rural District Coun­
cils, without accruing to the communities from 
which they are collected or directly addressing the 
environmental problems for which they will have 
been imposed. Lastly, the by-laws appear to fail 
to provide room for the coordination that is nec­
essary to address cross-border problems and spill­
over effects. Overall, such governance arrange­
ments are not widely respected since they are 
largely viewed as being illegitimate and oppres­
sive. Innovative approaches to governance are 
required to address most of these flaws and con­
tradictions.
Reversing top-down orientations in the assign­
ment of jurisdiction through the by-laws would 
be amongst the most radical approaches. It would 
involve reversals in by law articulation in which 
the formulation and operation of the by-laws are 
effectively placed in the hands of the citizens, with 
the council playing monitoring and coordination 
roles. The Institute of Environmental Studies is 
pioneering with such reversals on its DFID-funded 
M icro-catchm ent M anagement and Common 
Property Resources Project. The research objec­
tives of the project include: identifying a range of 
technical, institutional and other options for the 
management of micro-catchments; evaluating the 
impacts of the options on various biophysical, 
economic and institutional variables that have im­
plications on the micro-catchments, and interac­
tions among them; and, evaluating the poverty al­
lev ia tion  and env ironm enta l m anagem ent 
tradeoffs of the various options. The development 
objective includes providing policy makers, ex­
tension staff and communities with the tools with 
which to make sound management decisions, and 
promoting the implementation of such decisions 
(Frost and Mandondo, 1999).
Accomplished stages in the process of seeking 
institutional reversals on this project include ex­
ercises in which the study communities developed 
their visions on governance, at first separately, and 
later jointly, with their Rural District Council. The 
joint initiative yielded a wonderfully democratic
vision of by-law articulation in which communi­
ties would: formulate the by laws with council 
endorsing them; harmonize the multiplicity of 
rules at the local level, with the council endors­
ing; peg, collect and manage fines, with council 
monitoring the effectiveness; decide on the dis­
posal of the revenues collected from fines, with 
council negotiating a percentage depending on its 
levels of input; enforce, monitor and amend the 
by-laws, with the council giving necessary sup­
port; negotiate on cross-border and spill-over ef­
fects with the council coordinating and advising; 
etc. Clearance has already been secured from the 
Rural District Council to facilitate the crafting of 
such a vision, with a view to implementing it and 
documenting major lessons for wider uptake in 
other districts and related contexts. The support 
and interest of both the local communities and the 
Rural District Council have been, and will con­
tinue to be key to the initiative.
Another radical approach would be to lobby 
for the extension of legal mandate for local natu­
ral resource governance to units that are closer to 
the citizens below the district level. A question 
that receives scant attention in the literature, 
though, is the mode through which the fuzzy, dif­
fuse and ever-changing forms of social organiza­
tion at the grassroots level can coalesce into re­
source management units than can receive legal 
mandate. Murphree (1997) advocates for a strat­
egy of community identification involving self­
definition through the processes of dialogue and 
negotiation. He argues that such a process should 
take cognisance of long-established traditional ju ­
risdictions and resource management aggregations 
tha t m ake sense, in  order to m atch social 
geographies with spatial resource configurations. 
The widespread lack of respect for imposed by­
laws as well as poor enforcement and high de­
fault rates in the payment of fines all lend weight 
to “long established traditional jurisdictions” as 
potential appropriate units. The emphasis on these 
bodies also shares close resemblance to the rec­
ommendations of the Land Tenure Commission, 
set up in the early 1990s, to investigate appropri­
ate agricultural and land tenure systems across 
Zimbabwe’s land tenure categories (Government
15
A critique of by-law development and implementation
of Zimbabwe, 1994). The Commission concluded 
that the traditional villages, under village heads, 
were the legitimate and appropriate units for natu­
ral resource management below the district level. 
The Commission recommended for the granting 
of legal titles to well-mapped village units with 
clearly defined boundaries. Most of the recom­
mendations, except that relating to legal titles, 
were subsequently adopted by the government, 
and formed the basis of the Traditional Leaders 
Act of 1998, which provided for the empower­
ment of traditional authorities like chiefs and head­
men.
Considerable ambiguity still characterizes the 
assignment of jurisdiction across a number of Zim­
babwe’s environmental and other acts. Uncertainty 
still exists, in spite of the merits of the above units 
as possible candidates for legal mandate, the de­
merits of the units notwithstanding 10. Jurisdic­
tion over mineral resources, according to the 
Mines and Minerals Act, is still the exclusive pre­
serve of the state. The Rural District Councils Act 
assigns authority to enact by-laws between the 
state and the Rural District Councils. The Parks 
and Wildlife Act assigns jurisdiction over wild­
life resources among the state, the Rural District 
Councils in peasant areas, and the landed class in 
the freehold sector. The draft Environmental Man­
agement Bill broadens the portfolio of “appropri­
ate authority” to include a wider range of resources 
other than just wildlife. In spite of having been 
preceded by the Traditional Leaders Act, the draft 
bill does not complement the bold attempts of the 
former at defining potential legal units below the 
district level. The bill further seeks to vest such 
authority in Rural District Councils, without ex­
tending it to units below the district level.
Other approaches could be incremental - with 
an emphasis on securing and consolidating com­
munity gains from lobbying for changes in those 
aspects of current governance arrangements that 
are potentially maneuverable. Such an approach 
could, for instance, involve: lobbying for better
10 Indigenous governance forms were co-opted into colonial gov­
ernance forms, and were often remoulded to advance the designs 
and intentions of colonial administration to the extent whereby it 
may be misleading to speak o f “authentic indigenous forms” but 
“attenuated indigenous forms” (Chanock, 1998).
community representation in the RDDC, the dis­
tric t’s supreme planning body; lobbying for 
changes to ensure that the RDDC reports to, and 
is effectively accountable to council; or lobbying 
the relevant minister to give greater attention to 
criteria for community empowerment when he/ 
she endorses, amends or seeks the amendment of 
the existing sets of the Rural District Council by­
laws.
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Appendix 1: Areas over which Rural District Council enjoy legal mandate to enact
locally-binding by-laws (As per Rural District Councils Act, 1988).
Part 1, Council proceedings and financial Part 2, Controls over property 8. Protection o f
matters property controlled by council
1. Proceedings at meetings 9. Protection of common property
2. Disclosure of documents and publication of 10. Vegetation
proceedings 11. Conservation of natural resources
3. Financial 4. Contracts 12. Congregation, entry and parking on
5. Tenders property controlled by council
6. Capital development funds 13. Permits for certain activities on land
7. Allowances for councillors and members of controlled by council
committees 14. Removal of unauthorized buildings on land 
controlled by council
15. Advertisements
16. Depreciation of property
-17. Overcrowding
18. Limitation and control of occupation and
use of land and buildings
- 19. Excavations
20. Masts and poles
21. Hedges and trees
22. Fireplaces and chimneys
23. Cooking and washing facilities
24. Occupation or use of buildings
25. Dangerous and neglected buildings
26. Public buildings
27. Fire-fighting equipment and fire escapes
28. Numbering of premises and buildings
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Part 3, Planning, construction and use o f  
buildings and structures
29. Interpretation in Part 2
30. Location and situation
31. Plans, specifications and structural calcula­
tions
32. Nature, design arid appearance of buildings
33. Drainage and sewerage provision
34. Water supplies
35. Materials and construction
36. Conduct of building operations
37. Inspections, samples and tests
38. Temporary structures
39. Use of buildings
40. Completion of buildings
41. Use of scaffolding, hoarding or protective 
devices
42. Administration of by-laws relating to certain 
matters
43. General
Part 4, Roads and traffic
44. Work in vicinity of roads
45. Scaffolding and decorations on roads
46. Gatherings and noises in roads
47. Prevention of use of pavements for unau­
thorized purposes
48. Trees, shrubs, in relation to roads and road 
traffic
49. Regulation of use of roads
50. Naming of roads
51. Obstruction of roads and other public places
52. Processions and public meetings
53. Driving of stock
54. Loading and unloading
55. Use of warning devices
56. Parking of vehicles
57. Regulating and licensing cycles and certain 
other vehicles
58. Taxi-cabs and omnibuses
59. Drivers of taxi-cabs
60. Omnibuses
Part 5, Am enities and facilities
61. Public sanitary conveniences
62. Parks, recreation grounds, caravan parks, 
camping grounds etc
63. Boating establishments
64. Fish and fishing
65. Creches 66. General
67. Pollution of water
68. Wells and boreholes,
Part 6, Water
69. General
70. Pollution of water
71. Wells and boreholes
Part 7, Sewerage, effluent, the destruction o f  
insects and vermin and the rem oval o f  refuse 
and vegetation
72. Sewerage and drainage
73. Sanitary fittings
74. Effluent and refuse removal
75. Cleansing of private sewers, roads and yards
76. Crops, vegetation, rubbish and waste mate­
rial
11, Disease-carrying insects and vermin 
78. Noxious insects
Part 8, Animals, bees, reptiles, birds
79. Keeping of animals, bees, reptiles and 
birds 80. Public riding stables and kennels
81. Dog tax
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Part 9, Food, fo o d  prem ises or vehicles 
and markets
85. Sale and supply of food
86. Premises, vehicles and employees




Part 10, Trades, occupations and other 
activities
90. Dangerous trades
91. Employment bureaux and compulsory 
medical examination and treatment of work­
ers
92. Disinfection and fumigation
93. Infectious diseases
94. Hawkers and street vendors
95. Electricians
96. Plumbers and drain layers
97. Hairdressers, barbers and beauty saloons
98. Launderers, cleaners and dyers
99. Funeral parlours and mortuaries
100. Boarding houses-
101. Public auctions
102. Control of collections
Part 11, Nuisances
103. General
104. Horn, bells, etc
105. Use of loudspeakers
106. Objectionable advertisements, etc
Part 12, Functions, perform ances and  
amusements
107. Performances dangerous to the public
108. Amusements 109. Open-air events
Part 13, Fires, combustible materials and  
explosives
110. Fires
111. Bonfires and burning of rubbish
112. Combustible or inflammable material and 
explosives
Part 14, General
113. Control of any service, institution or thing
114. Inspections
115. Charges
116. Offences and penalties
20,
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons
Attribution -  Noncommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 License.
To view a copy of the license please see: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
This is a download from the BLDS Digital Library on OpenDocs
http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/
Institute of 
Development Studies
